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INTRODUCTION

With the vast majority of Minnesota corporations being
small, closely held businesses and most shareholders owning less
than a controlling interest in the corporations, it is important for
the practitioner to be familiar with the rights and remedies that
are available to minority shareholders of these corporations.
This Article briefly discusses the oppression of minority shareholders and then discusses the various theories and claims
minority shareholders may utilize to enforce their rights. Finally,
the Article discusses the general trend of increasing minority
shareholder rights and the recent Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision which appears to limit some of those rights.
II.

THE DILEMMA OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS

Close corporations1 typically are formed by friends, relatives, or other business associates who choose to combine their
capital, skills, labor and experience in a new business. Share-

1. The Minnesota Business Corporations Act (MCBA) defines a closely held
corporation as "a corporation which does not have more than 35 shareholders." MINN.
STAT. § 302A.011, subd. 6a (1994).
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holders in a close corporation generally plan to be employed by
the corporation and to have an active role in management. As
a result, shareholders usually expect to receive a salary, bonus
and additional benefits consistent with their roles as employees,
officers, and directors.
While close corporations begin as friendly ventures, the
balance of power in the close corporation often lends itself to
oppression of those shareholders who do not control the
corporation and usually own only a small percentage of sharesthe minority shareholders. Minority shareholders may be
subjected to a "freeze out," (sometimes known as a "squeeze
out") by the majority shareholders. 2 Typical "freeze out"
techniques include terminating the minority shareholder's
employment with the corporation or terminating dividends and
the minority shareholder's return on his or her investment.'
Although minority shareholders in any corporation are in a
difficult position due to their lack of control, minority shareholders in closely held corporations have uniquely difficult positions
because their shares are not readily marketable. In other words,
when minority shareholders in a large, publicly-traded corporation become dissatisfied with corporate operations, they can
"vote with their feet"--sell their shares and discontinue their
involvement with the corporation. Minority shareholders in the
closely held corporation, on the other hand, often cannot easily
sell their shares.4
The lack of a market for close corporation shares owned by
a minority shareholder means that a non-controlling investor
may be locked into a business that is providing little return on
investment, or at least is failing to fulfill the owner's nonmonetary expectations. Left without a meaningful return on his or
her investment, the minority shareholder may have little choice
but to sell for less than a fair price, usually to the majority
shareholders.
When the Minnesota Business Corporations Act (MBCA) was

2. See 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3:02 (2d ed. 1995) (illustrating various techniques for

accomplishing a "squeeze out").
3.

Id.

4. See 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 4:03 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that unlike shareholders in public corporations,

shareholders in close corporations cannot easily dispose of their corporate holdings).
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enacted by the Minnesota legislature in 1981, it contained several

important provisions for minority shareholders of closely held
corporations.5 Through subsequent judicial interpretations and
legislative amendments to the MBCA, minority shareholders'
rights have been significantly expanded.6

A recent decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
however, takes away many of the rights that have been provided
The
to minority shareholders over the last fifteen years.'
Skoglund decision leaves minority shareholders' rights on unsure
footing. At this time, it is unclear whether minority shareholders

have reached the pinnacle of their protection, with Skoglund
signalling a limit to their long-awaited rights, or whether
Skoglund is an anomaly which will be remedied by further judicial
decisions or legislative amendment.
III.

RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF SHAREHOLDERS
IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS

The basic causes of action available to a minority shareholder are: (1) dissolution or mandatory buy-out under Minnesota
Statute section 302A.751; (2) dissenter's rights actions; (3)
equitable remedies under Minnesota Statute section 302A.467;
or (4) shareholder derivative suits. While minority shareholders
may utilize any of the causes of action, the remedies under the
dissolution or buy-out provision of section 302A.751 are used
most frequently by minority shareholders.'
A. Dissolution or Mandatory Buy-out under Section 302A. 751
Section 302A.751, subdivision 1(b), offers the strongest
protection for a minority shareholder in a close corporation by
providing for equitable relief including, in an extreme case,
dissolution of the corporation.9 A mandatory buy-out of shares

5. Compare 1981 Minn. Laws ch. 270 (original Act) with MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.001.917 (1994 & Supp. 1995)(current Act).
6.

See infra Part III.

7. See Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. C. App. 1995), reniew denied
(Minn. 1996) (holding that plaintiff could not pursue an action under Minnesota
Statutes § 302A.751, subdivision 1, because he did not allege an injury to himself that
was separate and distinct from any injury to the corporation).
8. See, e.g., Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (involving buy-out remedy provided by Minnesota Statutes § 302A.75 1).
9. A buy-out or dissolution under Minnesota Statutes § 302A.751, subdivision 1,
is appropriate under any of the following circumstances:
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is a very significant remedy for minority shareholders under
section 302A.751.
If one of the section's six enumerated
circumstances is established, the court may, upon motion of a
corporation or a shareholder, order the sale by a plaintiff or a
defendant of all shares held by that party to either the corporation or the moving shareholders, whichever is specified in the
motion." Typically, a minority shareholder brings a motion for
a buy-out and asks that the corporation purchase the shareholder's shares. The buy-out motion contains several components
which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
1.

Unfairly PrejudicialConduct

When section 302A.751 was enacted in 1981, one of the
grounds for bringing a claim under the provision was when the
directors or those in control of the corporation had acted
fraudulently, illegally, or in a manner "persistently unfair" toward
one or more shareholders." In 1983, this language was amended to the current version, providing relief for "unfairly prejudicial conduct."12 Under the original language of the statute, the
shareholder had to establish a continuing course of abuse to
meet the "persistently unfair" standard.13 With the amended

1.

The directors are deadlocked in the management of the
corporate affairs and shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock;
2. The directors have acted fraudulently or illegally toward one or
more shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors,
or, in the case of a closely held corporation, in their capacities
as officers or employees;
3. The directors have acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward
one or more of the shareholders in their capacities as shareholders or directors of a corporation that is not a publicly held
corporation, or as officers or employees of a closely held
corporation;
4. The shareholders are so divided in voting power that they have
failed to elect directors for two consecutive regular meetings;
5. Corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted; or
6. The period of duration provided in the articles has expired and
has not been extended.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b) (1994).
10. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 2.
11. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b) (2) (1982).
12. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(2)(1984).
13. SeeJoseph E. Olson, A Statutory Elixirfor the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L.
REV. 627, 638 (1985) (explaining that the deletion of the term "persistently unfair" and
the substitution of the term "unfairly prejudicial" was designed to guarantee that the
new statute would be interpreted in a more liberal manner).
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language, a claim may succeed upon establishing just a single
instance of unfairly prejudicial conduct toward the minority
shareholder.14
2. Reasonable Expectations of All Shareholders
When it was enacted, the buy-out provision provided that, in
determining whether to order a buy-out or dissolution, the court
should take into consideration the special duty that shareholders
of a close corporation owe to one another and the reasonable
expectations of the shareholders as they existed at the inception
of the corporation and during its growth.15 The concept of the
shareholder's reasonable expectations has been applied broadly
to protect minority shareholder's rights.
For instance, in Pedro v. Pedro, the term "reasonable16
expectations" was defined to include lifetime employment.
Pedro involved a family-owned business owned equally by three
brothers. One of the shareholder brothers brought a claim
seeking dissolution of the corporation and damages for wrongful
termination after he found discrepancies in the corporation's
financial records and was subsequently fired. Although the
shareholder had been employed by the business for forty-five
years, his brothers warned him that he would be out of the
corporation if he continued his investigation. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals found that "[t]he reasonable expectations of
such a shareholder are a job, salary, a significant place in
management, and economic security for his family." 7 The
court found that the corporation 8violated an implied agreement
to provide lifetime employment.'
In the past, Minnesota courts interpreted the "reasonable
expectations" provision as requiring courts to consider only the

14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751, (1994) (Reporter's Notes 1982-84, subd. 1); see
also Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991).
15. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 2a (1982).
16. 489 N.W.2d 798, 803 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
17. Id. at 802 (quoting Olson, supra note 13 at 629).
18. Id.; see also Sawyer 1991 WL 65320, at *2. In Sawyer, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed a buy-out of the shares of a corporation's president and chief
executive officer who had been removed from her position by the board of directors.
The court determined that the shareholder's reasonable expectations of a position in
the corporation were frustrated and that she was therefore entitled to a buy-out of her
shares. Sawyer, 1991 WL 65320, at *2.
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reasonable expectations of the complaining shareholders.1 9 The
1994 amendments changed the "reasonable expectations"
language, however, to "the reasonable expectations of all
shareholders."" The reasonable expectations of both majority
and minority shareholders should now be examined by the court
when determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution
or a buy-out.
3. Presumptionfor Written ShareholderAgreements
In addition, the 1994 legislature added a sentence to the
buy-out provision which created a presumption that written
shareholder agreements reflect the parties' reasonable expecta21
tions for the matters addressed in the agreement.
Prior to the amendment, courts had not always given
significant weight to shareholder agreements. In fact, some
courts acknowledged that shareholder agreements provided
evidence of the shareholders' reasonable expectations, but
refused to follow the plain language of shareholder or employment agreements.2 2 Under the 1994 amendment, however,
written shareholder agreements are presumed to reflect the
parties' intentions. The amendment emphasizes the importance
of considering the parties' expectations as reflected in the
agreements they have signed. Indeed, the amendment has the
effect of encouraging parties to accurately set forth their
expectations and intentions in written agreements relating to
their stock or employment with the corporation. If the agreement accurately reflects the parties' expectations and is the
product of arms-length negotiations, the agreement is presumptively valid. 2' A shareholder may rebut the presumption that
his or her reasonable expectations are set forth in an agreement
by demonstrating that the provision regarding "expectations" is
ambiguous, being read out of context or not the product of an

19.

See Pedro, 489 N.W.2d at 802.

20. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3a (1994) (emphasis added).
21. The added sentence reads: "[f]or purposes of this section, any written
agreements, including employment agreements and buy-sell agreements, between or
among shareholders or between or among one or more shareholders and the corporation are presumed to reflect the parties' reasonable expectations concerning matters
dealt with in the agreements." Id. § 302A.751, subd. 3a (1994).
22. See, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990),

reconfirmed 489 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
23.

MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3a.
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arms-length negotiation. The complaining shareholder always
will have the traditional contract defenses regarding enforceability of the expectations provision of the agreement.
4. Behavior of Minority Shareholders

An interesting issue presented in context of the buy-out
motion is whether misconduct by a minority shareholder should
affect either the shareholder's right to a buy-out or the valuation
of his or her shares in the buy-out process. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals examined this issue and concluded that the
behavior of the minority shareholder should not be considered
when determining the right to a buy-out or the value of the
minority shareholder's shares in a buy-out under section
302A.751.24
Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc. involved a family

corporation which was owned equally by Terry, Gregory and
Ronald Pooley.25 Terry Pooley (Pooley) had a history of
misconduct relating to the corporation that included pleading
guilty to assault in the scope of his employment in the early
1980S.26 In 1989, Pooley assaulted Gregory Pooley, damaged a
customer's truck and, was convicted of assault and criminal
damage to property.27 After his conviction, the corporation
terminated his employment and the shareholders voted him out
as an officer and director.28
Pooley sued the corporation and its directors for breach of
an implied employment contract and for "unfairly prejudicial"
conduct under section 302A.751. 29 The trial court found no
implied contract for lifetime employment, but concluded that
the corporation's directors had "unfairly prejudiced [Pooley] by
freezing him out of a business in which he reasonably expected
to participate. " ° The trial court ordered a buy-out of his shares
at fair value.31
The trial court found and the court of appeals affirmed that

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 836.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Pooley was entitled to the fair value of his shares despite his
misconduct.3 2 The corporation had also argued that balancing
the equities required a discount to the value of Pooley's
shares.3 3 However, the court of appeals rejected that argument
and determined that because the trial court had already
determined that Pooley was entitled to the fair value of his
shares, the court "did not have reason to later discount that
value." 4
Even with the fairly egregious conduct of the shareholder in
Pooley, the court refused to use "bad" behavior as a limit on the
minority shareholder's right to obtain a buy-out. Pooley is a good
example of the strong protections that minority shareholders
have been given under the MBCA."5
5. An Enlightened Decision?
While the typical buy-out case involves the minority shareholder selling his or her shares to the corporation, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, interpreting a statute remarkably similar
to Minnesota Statutes section 302A.751, recently upheld a trial
court ruling ordering majority shareholders to sell their controlling interest in a closely held corporation to the minority
shareholder.3 6 In Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., the court concluded that the majority shareholders exercised their majority power
in a manner which conflicted with the expectations of the
minority.3 7 The minority shareholder had been primarily
responsible for the company's day-to-day operations and the
majority shareholders had provided capital and the inventive
genius for the company's products.3 8 When conflict developed
among the shareholders, the majority shareholders voted to
declare substantial dividends to all shareholders and to assert
themselves in the daily operations of the company, thereby
usurping the minority shareholder's role.3" Claiming that the
corporation was deadlocked, the majority voted to dissolve the

32. Id. at 838.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. It appears, however, that the court of appeals may be shifting from the strong
protection previously provided to minority shareholders. See infra section V.
36. See Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382 (N.J. 1996).
37. Id. at 1388-89.
38. Id. at 1383-84.
39. Id. at 1384.
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corporation and instituted proceedings to that end.4°
The NewJersey Supreme Court concluded that it was a close
question whether the actions of the. majority amounted to
oppression.4" After carefully analyzing the New Jersey statute,
which prohibited majority shareholders from abusing their
authority as directors or acting oppressively or unfairly towards
one or more minority shareholders in their capacities as
shareholders, directors, officers or employees, the court concluded that the majority's actions constituted oppressive conduct
which frustrated the reasonable expectations of the minority
shareholder.42 Most importantly, the court concluded that the
appropriate remedy was to order the sale of the majority's shares
to the minority since the minority had the expectation of longand had, in fact, been running the company
term employment
43
on a daily basis.
6. Valuation of Shares in Section 302A. 751 Actions
In a court ordered buy-out, the purchase price for the
shares is the "fair value" of the shares either as of the date of
commencement of the action or any other date deemed
equitable by the court." "Fair value" shall be the price unless
the parties have established another price for the shares in the
corporation's bylaws or a shareholder agreement, which price is
reasonable under all circumstances.45 The MBCA contains
specific instructions regarding the procedure for determination
of fair value. Because these follow the valuation procedures for
dissenters' rights actions, those procedures will be discussed in
that section.'
B. Dissenters' Rights
The dissenters' rights statutes, Minnesota Statutes sections 302A.471-.473, permit a shareholder to "dissent" from
certain fundamental corporate changes and obtain payment
from the corporation for the "fair value" of the shares. In

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 1388.
Id. at 1388-89.
Id. at 1389.
See § 302A.751, subd. 2.
Id.
See infra section III.B.4.
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contrast to section 302A.751, which allows a shareholder to
obtain payment for his or her shares by showing a broad range
of "unfairly prejudicial conduct,"4 7 the dissenters' rights statute
only allows a shareholder to obtain payment for his or her shares
upon the occurrence of one of five enumerated triggering
events.48
1.

TriggeringEvents for Dissenters' Rights

Dissenters' rights are available when a shareholder dissents
from various fundamental corporate changes such as a merger
or amendment to the articles that will adversely affect the
shareholder's rights.4 9 Several decisions have further developed
the circumstances under which shareholders are entitled to
dissenters' rights. For instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court
determined that, at least in a close corporation, the following
actions "materially and adversely" affect shareholders' rights and
therefore create dissenters' rights: (1) elimination of a requirement of thirty percent shareholder approval for certain major
decisions; (2) reduction in the maximum number of directors
from five to three; and (3) elimination of a requirement of
seventy-five percent shareholder approval for bylaw amend50
ments.
In an unpublished case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
held that dissenters' rights are not triggered if the corporate

47. See § 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(3).
48. See § 302A.471, subd. 1.
49. Specifically, the dissenters' rights statute enumerates the following fundamental
corporate changes as triggering events entitling a shareholder to relief under the

statute:
a.

An amendment of the articles that materially and adversely

c.
d.

affects the rights of the dissenting shareholder;
A disposition of substantially all of the corporation's assets not
made in the usual or regular course of its business;
A plan of merger to which the corporation is a party;
A plan of exchange under which the shares of the corporation

e.

will be acquired by another corporation; and
Any other corporate action taken pursuant to a shareholder vote

b.

under which the articles, bylaws, or a resolution provides that
dissenting shareholders may obtain payment for shares.
Id.
50.

Whetstone v. Hossfeld Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d 380, 381-82 (Minn. 1990).

Specifically, the Whetstone court concluded that these actions fell within part (4) of
§ 302A.471, subdivision 1(a) which "[e]xcludes or limits the right of a shareholder to
vote on a matter or to cumulate votes." Id. at 382.
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action from which a shareholder dissents turns out to be
invalid.5 1 Similarly, the court of appeals has determined that a
dissenting shareholder's right to payment for shares does not
52
vest until the triggering corporate action takes effect.

2. Dissenters' Rights as Exclusive Remedy
Minnesota courts have held that the triggering of dissenters'
rights forecloses a shareholder's action based on any alleged
unfairness of the corporate change that gave rise to the rights.
For instance, in Sifferle v. Micom Corp., the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that a dissenters' rights action is the exclusive
remedy available to a shareholder unless the action dissented
from is fraudulent.5"
3. Procedurefor Asserting Dissenters' Rights
The procedure for asserting dissenters' rights is specifically
explained in Minnesota Statutes section 302A.473. At the outset,
a corporation planning a vote at a shareholder meeting on any
action that triggers dissenters' rights must include with its
meeting notice a separate notice informing shareholders of their
right to dissent and a brief description of the statutory procedure.5 4
A dissenting shareholder then must (1) file a notice of
intent to demand fair value for the shares before the vote, and

51. Bowman v. MWCG Export Co., No. C4-90-1654, 1991 WL 30342, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1991).
52. Goins v. Lang, No. C8-93-1381, 1994 WL 43859, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 15,
1994). In Coins, the corporation had informed its shareholders of a proposed merger.
Id. at *1. The merger ultimately did not occur because one of the corporation's lenders, whose consent was required to consummate the merger, rejected the merger. The
dissenting shareholder had alleged that his dissenters' rights had been triggered when
the corporation gave him untimely notice of the shareholder merger vote. The court
held that because the merger did not take place, the shareholder was not entitled to
dissenters' rights. Id.
53. Sifferle v. Micom Corp., 384 N.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); see also
Broin v. National Computer Sys., Inc., No. C9-91-235, 1991 WL 204460, at *1-2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1991). Although the Siffere court defined "fraudulent" broadly, it
rejected an even broader reading when it refused to permit shareholders to challenge
the "entire fairness" of the transaction. Siffer/e, 384 N.W.2d at 507. The entire fairness
doctrine, as developed in Delaware and elsewhere, allows a shareholder to challenge a
merger that violates the obligation of fair dealing among fellow shareholders. See
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104-05 (Del. 1985); Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-14 (Del. 1983).
54. See § 302A.473, subd. 2.
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(2) not vote in favor of the proposed corporate action.55
After approval of the proposed action by the board, and
when necessary the shareholders, the corporation must send
shareholders who filed a notice of intent another notice of their
dissenters' rights.5 6 This notice must describe the dissenters'
rights statute and include a form that the shareholder may use
to demand payment. 7
In response to this after-the-fact notice, a dissenter has thirty
days to perfect his or her rights by demanding payment from the
corporation and surrendering his or her shares. 5' When the
triggering corporate action occurs without a shareholder vote,
this demand is the dissenter's first, and 5only
requirement for
9
perfecting the statutory dissenters' rights.
4. Valuation of Shares in a Dissenters' Rights Action
In both a dissenters' rights action and a buy-out motion
under section 302A.751, the MBCA provides for determination
of the "fair value"' of the shares
using the process contained
61
in the dissenters' rights statute.

a. Procedurefor DeterminingFair Value
After the entry of a buy-out order, the corporation has five
days to provide the shareholder with its determination of "fair
value" and other information required by the dissenters' rights
provision.62 If the parties do not agree on a fair value for the
shares within forty days of the entry of the buy-out order, the
court determines the fair value of the shares using the provisions
of the dissenters' rights statute63 and may also allow interest or

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

§ 302A.473, subd. 3.
§ 302A.473, subd. 4(a).
§ 302A.473, subd. 4(a)(3)(4).
§ 302A.473, subd. 4(b).
See § 302A.473, subd. 4(a).
If the court orders a buy-out of the shares under section 302A.751, the

purchase price of the shares will be the fair value as of the date of the commencement
of the action or as of another date found equitable by the court. § 302A.751, subd. 2.
In a dissenters' rights action, the valuation date is "immediately before the effective date
of the corporate action" from which the shareholder dissents. § 302A-473, subd. 1 (c).
61. See § 302A.473, subds. 5-8.
62. See § 302A.751, subd. 2. The dissenters' rights provision, which specifies the
information that must be given to the shareholder, is found in Minnesota Statutes
§ 302A.473 subd. 5(a).
63. See § 302A.473, subd. 7.
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64

The MBCA gives the court broad discretion in determining
"fair value."65 The court may take into account "any and all
factors the court finds relevant" when determining "fair value."
The court may also appoint an appraiser "to receive
evidence on and recommend the amount of the fair value of the
shares."67 The Minnesota Court of Appeals has noted that,
while a court may rely on an appraiser's recommendation, it may
not actually delegate its authority to determine fair value.'
b.

Determinationof Fair Value

"Fair value" is not the same as, or short-hand for, "fair market
value."69 "Fair value" carries with it the statutory purpose that
shareholders be fairly compensated, which may or may not
equate with the market's judgment about the stock's value.7"
This is particularly appropriate in the close corporation setting
where there is no ready market for the shares and consequently
no fair market value.
In addition, most courts, including Minnesota's, have noted
that determination of fair value requires valuation of the
corporation as a whole, which is then multiplied by the dissent-

64. See § 302A.751, subd. 2. Interest or costs are allowed under Minnesota Statutes
§ 302A.473, subds. 1, 8.
65. § 302A.473, subd. 7; see also National Computer Sys., Inc. v. Bordonaro, No. C989-1370, 1990 WL 13383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (asserting that it is within the court's
discretion to determine fair value by the use of. market value, book value, replacement
value, or capitalization of earnings).
66. Section 302A.473, subd. 7.
67. Id.
68. Zenanko v. Vukelich, No. C2-90-1264, 1991 WL 6379, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan.
29, 1991); Schaub v. Kortgard, 372 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (using fair
value determination of § 302A.473, subdivision 7 to establish price for mandatory buy
out under § 302A.751, subd. 2). In Zenanko, the court of appeals affirmed an appraisal,
following a mandatory buy-out motion, that valued a co-owner's interest in the
corporation at zero dollars based on the independent appraiser's determination that
liabilities exceeded assets. Zenanko 1991 WL 6379, at *2.
69. See, e.g., Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Icahn, 946 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (2d Cir. 1991); TriContinental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950); see also supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text.
70. See § 302A.473, subd. 1(c) (defining "fair value of the shares" as "the value of
the shares of a corporation immediately before the effective date of a corporate action
referred to in § 302A.471, subdivision 1, [provision triggering dissenters' rights]"); see
also 2 O'NEIL & THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 7:21 (discussing various approaches for
determining fair value of shares in legislative or judicial buyout provisions).
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er's percentage of ownership, not valuation of individual
shares.71 The Delaware Supreme Court, home to many highstakes appraisal proceedings, provided a classic statement of "fair
value":
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that
the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been
taken from him ...

his proportionate interest in a going

concern. By value of the stockholder's proportionate interest
in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic
value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In
determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic
value, the appraiser and the courts must take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter
into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value,
dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and
any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of merger and which throw any light on
future prospects of the merged corporation are not only
pertinent to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting
stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the agency
fixing the value.72
Put another way, the statute requires valuation of the corporation as a "going concern basis."73 Further, one court has noted
that determination of fair value is "more akin to an artistic
composition than to a scientific process."7 4
A court also has discretion to award reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees and disbursements, to any of the parties
if the court finds that a party has acted "arbitrarily, vexatiously,
or otherwise not in good faith."7 5 This provision offers additional protection for the minority shareholder who has been
wronged by an abusive majority.

71. See MT Properties, Inc. v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383, 387 n.3
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Cavalier Oil Coop. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del.
1989)); see also Spinnaker Software Corp. v. Nicholson, 495 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Minn. Ct.

App. 1993).
72. Tri-ContinentalCorp., 74 A.2d at 72.
73. Id.; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218
(Del. 1975).
74. In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A-2d 54, 60
(Me. 1979).
75. § 302A.751, subd. 4; § 302A.473, subd. 8.
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c. Valuation Methods
If the court does not appoint an appraiser, determination of
fair value develops into a battle of the experts. The analytical
methods used by experts vary, but are generally based on
common principles of business valuation.
Many courts once relied on a valuation formula known as
the "Delaware Block" rule. Based only on three factors, the
Delaware block method made it difficult for courts to take
additional factors into account, such as the difference between
76
a growth-oriented company and an income-based company.
Thus, courts in Delaware and elsewhere now tend to use a more
flexible approach called the "all relevant factors" method. 7
The "all relevant factors" method considers all relevant
factors when non-speculative elements of value are proven.78
This new method is consistent with the Delaware statute which
was amended in 1981 to read that appraisers should "take into
account all relevant factors." 79 The only limitation on relevant
factors is found in the statute itself. The statute requires that
value be determined exclusive of any element of value that arose
from the merger.s However, the "all relevant factors" method

76. The Delaware block method relies on three different elements of value:
market value, asset value, and earnings value. See In re General Realty & Util. Corp., 52
A.2d 6, 14-15 (Del. Ch. 1947). See generally E. Veasey &J. Finkelstein, AppraisalRightsand
Fairness of Price in Mergers and Consolidations (BNA Corp. Prac. Series No. 38 1987)
(discussing Delaware's appraisal statute and the factors used for share valuation). These
factors are each assigned a weight and the resulting amounts added to determine the
value per share. Id.
77. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme
Court replaced the Delaware block method of valuation with the "all relevant factors"
approach used elsewhere. Id. at 712-14; see, e.g., Hunter v. Mitek Indus., Inc., 721
F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (E.D. Mo. 1989); TV58 Ltd. Parmership v. Weigel Broadcasting Co.,
1993 WL 285850, at *I (Del. Ch. July 22, 1993).
78. See Weinberger 457 A.2d at 712-13; DEL. STAT. § 262(h) (1990).
79. DEL. STAT. § 262(h) (1990).
80. Id. Thus, "[o]nly the speculative elements of value that may arise from the
'accomplishment or expectation' of the merger are excluded." Weinberger,457 A.2d at
713.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has also rejected the corporation's argument that
the purchase price of the merged corporation must be presumed to establish "fair
value." Spinnaker Software Corp. v. Nicholson, 495 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993). In Spinnaker, the trial court's determination of fair value, which exceeded the
dissenting shareholder's estimate of fair value, was upheld. Id. The corporation had
paid the shareholder $0.90 per common share and $1.575 per preferred share. The
shareholder demanded $1.75 and $3.00, respectively. The trial court concluded fair
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allows courts to use any method of analysis that is accepted in
the financial community."1
Thus, the "all relevant factors"
method provides a more flexible approach to valuation.
d.

Valuation Discounts

Courts have struggled over the propriety of applying various
valuation discounts in both buy-out motions and in dissenters'
rights cases. Some courts have permitted discounts for lack of
control, lack of marketability, and stock transfer restrictions.
Other courts have concluded that, although perhaps appropriate
in other valuation settings, discounts are not relevant in determining "fair value."
i.

Discountfor Lack of Control

For most valuation purposes, minority shares may be
discounted to reflect the decreased value attributed to the
shares' lack of control over corporate decision-making. 2 A
minority discount can be substantial and often ranges from
fifteen to thirty-five percent of value. 3
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that a minority
discount is improper under the dissenters' rights statute. 4
After surveying a split in decisions from other jurisdictions, the
court concluded that the legislature's "evident aim" of protecting
dissenting shareholders precluded use of discounts for lack of
control.8 5 The Minnesota Court of Appeals has also rejected
application of a discount for lack of control of shares in a
value was $2.16 and $3.00. Id. at 443.
81. Spinnaker, 495 N.W.2d at 445; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
82. See 2 O'NEIL & THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 7:21 (recognizing that one of the
most important valuation issues in a buy-out is whether the value of stock once
determined should be discounted because the stock is a minority interest).
83. See MT Properties, Inc. v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992) (approving a 22% discount to the value of stocks to reflect, in part, the
minority status of the shares). The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, disallowed the
discount. Id. at 386.
84. See id. at 388. After trial, the district court in MTPropertiesapproved the initial
"fair value" payment made by the corporation, including a 22% discount value to reflect
the minority status of the dissenters' shares, lack of marketability, and possible
environmental contamination of corporate property. On appeal, the court of appeals
first concluded that, despite the other rationales for the discount contained in the trial
court's findings, "the discount.., was attributable solely [to reflect the shareholder's]
minority status." Id. at 386. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, disallowed the
discount. Id.
85. Id. at 388.
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section 302A.751 buy-out.8 6
Courts in other jurisdictions have taken conflicting views on
the issue of permitting a minority discount. The majority of
jurisdictions, along with Minnesota,17 have rejected the application of a discount to the dissenting shareholder's shares based
upon the shares lack of control."s Several courts have held,
however, that a dissenting shareholder's shares can be discounted to reflect the lack of control in the corporation.8 9 Though
not addressed by the court in MT Properties, one can argue that
the cases rejecting a discount for lack of control are better
reasoned because they consider the statute's purpose, while most
courts approving use of the discount have done so without
analyzing the policy underlying the statute.

86. Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. CtL App. 1994).
87. In MT Properties, the Minnesota Court of Appeals specifically noted that its
holding was in line with a majority ofjurisdictions addressing the issue. MTProperties,
Inc., 481 N.W.2d at 387-88 nn.2, 4.
88. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying MTProperties,has rejected the
use of a minority discount. See Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1993); see also
Hunter v. Mitek Indus., 721 F. Supp. 1102, 1106-07 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (opining that
under Missouri's dissenting shareholder rights statute, minority and marketability
discounts were not applied to calculate the fair market value of the dissenting
shareholder's stock); Rigel Corp. v. Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Neb.
1994) (rejecting both minority and marketability discounts); Charland v. Country View
Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d 609, 611-12 (R.I. 1991) (stating that when a corporation buys
out the shares of dissenting shareholders, the fact that the share are noncontrolling is
"irrelevant"); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (rejecting
both minority and marketability discounts); In re McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1004
(Me. 1989) (explaining that when valuing a shareholder's stock, the court will prorate
the value for the whole corporation equally); Richardson v. Palmer Broadcasting Co.,
353 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Iowa 1984) (finding that any effort to adjust the value of minority
shares downward is "contrary to the spirit of a 'fair value' determination."); Columbia
Management Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 214 (Or. 1988) (en banc) (stating that the
application of a minority discount penalizes all shareholders); Walter S. Cheesman
Realty Co. v. Moore, 770 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (citing cases both for
and against discounting the shares of minority shareholders) ;Johnston v. Hickory Creek
Nursery, Inc., 521 N.E.2d 236, 239-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding that the discount did
not apply when the remaining shareholders bought the minority shares resulting in a
substantial increase).
89. See Hernando Bankv. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Miss. 1985), affd, 796 F.2d
803 (5th Cir. 1986); Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ind. 1983),
aff'd, 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984); Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776
(Ohio 1987); Foglesong v. Thurston Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 606 (Okla. 1976);
Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Moore v.
New Ammest, Inc., 630 P.2d 167 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
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ii.

Marketability Discounts

A discount for lack of marketability, (or illiquidity) reflects
the fact that investors will pay less for an interest that cannot be
freely traded, as it would be if listed on an organized
exchange.9" Jurisdictions also are split on the applicability of
a discount for lack of marketability. Several courts have denied
application of marketability discounts.9 1 Several jurisdictions,
however, have permitted marketability discounts.9 2
iii. Key Person Discount

A key person discount is applied in some business valuations
to reflect the reliance of the business' success upon one individual."3 At least one Minnesota court has considered the applicability of a key person discount, but did not decide the issue
because it held that the shareholder was not a key person and
that there were other competent people who could operate the
business.94 However, a key person discount has been upheld in
Delaware. 95
iv. Discountsfor Contingent Liabilities

The Minnesota Court of Appeals in MT Properties also
considered the question of permitting reductions in value for
possible corporate liabilities not shown on the corporation's

90. See 2 O'NEIL & THOMPSON supra note 2, § 7:21 (recognizing the fact that there
is no market for stock in a close corporation is an important consideration in valuation
and the decision to discount).
91. See Foy v. Kapmeier, Civ. No. 3-90-292, 1993 WL 246127, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb.
8, 1993). The court held the marketability discount was not appropriate as a result of
the statutory obligation of the corporation to purchase the dissenting shareholder's
shares the dissenters' rights statute. Id. at *7-8. The Eighth Circuit did not address the
issue on appeal. Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1993); In re McLoon Oil Co.,
565 A.2d 997 (Me. 1989); Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d 609 (R.I.
1991).
92. See Stanton v. Republic Bank, 581 N.E.2d 678, 681-82 (Ill. 1991); Ford v.
Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); King v.
F.T.J., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 301, 305-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
93. A key person typically "performs highly personal or unique services from which
the entire business income is derived." Nemitz v. Nemitz, 376 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn.
CL App. 1985).
94. Roalstad v. Roalstad, No. C4-91-2099, 1992 WL 115379, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 2, 1992).
95. See Hodas v. Spectrum Technology, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11,265, 1992 WL 364682,
at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1992).
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financial statements.96 In that case, the trial court had approved the corporation's three million dollar reduction in value
for "contingent liabilities" based on concerns over possible labor
and environmental litigation.9 7 The court of appeals held that
actual loss from the contingencies was "reasonably probable" and
such contingencies might have been considered in a hypothetical
"willing seller-willing buyer" scenario.9 8 Thus, the discount was
allowed.9 9
C. Equitable Remedies under Section 302A.467
In addition to the other relief provided by the MBCA,
equitable relief may be granted by a court in an action brought
by a shareholder if the court finds that a violation of the MBCA
has occurred."0
This section recognizes that situations in
which equitable relief may be appropriate are not easily defined
in advance, as they often present novel fact situations.10 1 As a
result, this section adopts a broad rule which gives the court
complete discretion in ordering whatever relief it deems just and
10 2
reasonable under the circumstances.
Minnesota courts have placed some limitations on the
equitable remedies which might be awarded under section
302A.467. For instance, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held
that section 302A.467 does not authorize a court to force a buyout of dissenting shareholders when such a buy-out could not be
obtained under the dissenters' provision contained in section
302A.471. 3
In addition, relief under section 302A.467 is
probably limited to shareholders who held their stock when the

96. See MT Properties v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383, 389-90 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Minnesota Statutes § 302A467 provides:
If a corporation or an officer or director of the corporation violates
a provision of this chapter, a court in this state may, in an action
brought by a shareholder of the corporation, grant any equitable
relief it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances and award
expenses, including attorneys' fees and disbursements, to the
shareholder.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.467 (1994).

101.
102.
103.

See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.467, (West 1994) (Reporter's Notes- 1981).
Id. (Reporter's Notes-1981, General Comment).
Westgor v. Grimm, 381 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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4

D. ShareholderDerivative Suits
Although any shareholder may bring a derivative suit against
a corporation, understandably, they are more often brought by
minority shareholders. Procedural requirements for bringing a
derivative suit are governed by Rule 23.06 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure and by Federal Rule 23.1. The state
and federal rules provide similar procedural hurdles. Although
the Rules of Civil Procedure contain many requirements for a
derivative suit, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the rules are not controlling for dismissal of a suit because they
are procedural rather than substantive.10 5
1.

Requirementsfor BringingDerivative Suits
a.

Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement

The derivative complaint must "allege that the plaintiff was
a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which
the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff's share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of
law.""0 6 Courts have inferred from the language of the rules
that the plaintiff must also maintain ownership of the stock for
the duration of the suit.10 7 Each of these requirements originates "from the equitable nature of a derivative suit which allows
a shareholder 'to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek
in its right the restitution he could not demand in his own.""0 "
b.

Demand Requirement
Shareholders bringing a derivative suit must make demand
upon the board of directors before commencing suit.'0 9 The

104. See PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 1990) (analyzing
§ 302A.751).
105. SeeKamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1991), revg, 908 F.2d
1338 (7th Cir. 1990); see also RCM Sec. Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1329 (2d
Cir. 1991).
106. MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06.
107. See Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1983).
108. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)).
109. See Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union, 259 Minn. 257, 266-67, 107
N.W.2d 226, 233 (1961) (requiring that demand be made to the board of directors
unless a majority of the board is involved in the action precipitating the suit).
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demand requirement gives the corporation, through its board,
the opportunity to assume the action itself to remedy harm to
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 23.06
the corporation.1
requires that the derivative suit complaint allege with particularity the efforts that were made to obtain the desired action from
the board or from fellow shareholders, and the reasons for the
plaintiff's failure to obtain action or for not making the efforts."'
As indicated by the language of Rule 23.06, many states,
including Minnesota, recognize an exception which may excuse
the demand requirement if asking the corporation to take up
the suit would be unduly expensive or "futile."112 The futility
exception, as an example, may arise when the directors upon
whom demand would be made have a conflict of interest
Most states require a plaintiff to plead
regarding the suit.'
with specificity the reasons a demand would be futile." 4 The
pleadings must "create a reasonable doubt that the directors are
disinterested and independent."115
The United States Supreme Court has held that availability
of the futility exception for claims based on federal law must be
governed by the relevant state law.1 6 In so ruling, the Court
rejected the Seventh Circuit's determination that demand is
never excused for futility when the derivative suit is based on
federal law." 7 The Court thereby required federal courts to
recognize the futility exception, which is provided by most states.
c. Representation of Shareholders' Interest
Requirement
Rule 23.06 requires a plaintiff to establish that he or she8
adequately represents the interest of all shareholders."

110.

Id.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06.
See Winter, 107 N.W.2d at 234.
See id.
See Good v.Getty Oil Co., 514 A.2d 1104, 1109 (Del. Ch. 1986).
Id.

116. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 101 (1991).
117. Id. at 108-09.
118. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06. A derivative action may not be maintained if it
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interest of the
shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or
association. Id.
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Because the plaintiff is essentially enforcing the right of the
*corporation, the plaintiff must represent the other shareholders'
interests, in addition to his or her own, when bringing a
derivative action." 9
d.

"Security for Expenses" (Bond) Requirement

Minnesota, unlike some states, does not require plaintiffs in
derivative suits to provide "security for expenses," which is
typically satisfied by a bond.2 0 Nineteen states (not including
Delaware) have statutes permitting defendants in derivative
actions to demand that the plaintiff post security for expenses,
including attorneys' fees that the corporation may incur.1 2'
Typically with these statutes, the court determines the amount of
security. 2 In addition, most of the statutes requiring security
apply only when the plaintiff is a small shareholder, typically with
less than five percent ownership of a class of stock or less than
1 23
twenty-five thousand dollars in market value.
Minnesota, unlike forty-one states, also does not have a
general statute permitting defendants to demand that plaintiffs
furnish a bond for "costs." 2 4 Most federal district courts have
a similar local rule, although many apply only to nonresident
25
plaintiffs, but again, Minnesota is not among them.
2.

The Use of Special Litigation Committees in Derivative
Actions

When the MBCA was enacted in 1981, there was a separate
section dealing with the board of director's authority to appoint
committees.1 26 Section 302A.243 provided that the board
could establish a committee of two or more "disinterested"
directors or other persons to determine whether pursuing a legal

119.
120.

Id.
See2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON supranote 2, § 8:16 (stating that many states require

a plaintiff in a derivative suit to provide security for the expenses a corporation may
incur in defending such a suit).
121. See D. DEMoTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS LAW AND PRACTICE, § 3:01
(1994).
122. Id.

123. Id. § 3:02.
124. Id. § 3:03.
125.
126.

Id.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.243 (1982).
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27
right or remedy was in the best interest of the corporation.1
The statute defined "disinterested" and further stated that the
good faith determinations of the committee were binding upon

the corporation. 128
Thus, when a derivative action was brought against a
corporation, the board of directors could appoint a special
litigation committee to review the allegations of the complaint.
The committee had the power to hire accounting firms or other
professionals to assist in the investigation of the claims. At the
conclusion of its investigation, the committee would make a
recommendation to the board of directors regarding whether
the corporation should proceed with the claims. If the commit-

tee recommended that the corporation not pursue the lawsuit,
the board of directors generally would follow the committee's

recommendation and not take any action. The shareholders
who brought the possible claims to the attention of the corporation had no other recourse unless they qualified to bring their
claims under Minnesota Statutes sections 302A.467 or
302A.751. 2 9
In Black v. NuAire, Inc., the Minnesota Court of Appeals
interpreted the committee statute as limiting the court's review
of a committee's decision to dismiss a shareholder's derivative
action to whether the recommendation was made by a disinterested committee conducting its investigation in good faith.3 0
With its limited scope ofjudicial review for committee decisions,
Black struck a blow to derivative actions. Unless shareholders
could establish that the committee was not independent or did
not make its recommendation in good faith, they could not
bring their derivative action after the corporation had decided
not to pursue it based upon a committee recommendation. 3 '
In 1989, the year following the court of appeals' decision in
Black, the Minnesota Legislature repealed section 302A.243 and
amended section 302A.241 to take its place. The legislature
repealed section 302A.243 with the statement that the repeal
"does not imply that the legislature has accepted or rejected the

127.
128.
129.
special
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
See DEMOTT, supra note 121, § 5:01 (giving an overview of the function of a
litigation committee).
Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 209-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
Id.
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substance of the repealed section but must be interpreted in the
1 2
same manner as if section 302A.243 had not be [sic] enacted."
Since 1989, the corporation's authority to appoint a special
litigation committee is governed by Minnesota Statutes section
302A.241, subdivision 1, which provides that corporations may
appoint special litigation committees consisting of one or more
independent directors or other independent persons to consider
the legal rights or remedies of the corporation and whether
those rights and remedies should be pursued.113 It is unclear
what the legislature intended by these small changes between the
repealed section and the amended section. Until recently, there
had been no court decisions dealing with the new amended
section regarding committees.
In 1995, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reinstated the Black
standard of judicial review for committee decisions. 134 In
Skoglund, the court determined that under section 302A.241,
judicial review of a special litigation committee recommendation
was limited to whether the committee was independent and
conducted the investigation in good faith.1 35 The court relied
136
on Black, as if section 302A.243 had never been repealed.
IV. DUTIES OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS
IN A CLOSE CORPORATION

A.

GeneralDuties and Obligations

Despite the important differences between larger corporations and close corporations, the MBCA does not distinguish
between the two for most purposes. As a result, close corporations and their officers and directors are bound by the same
duties and obligations as larger, publicly-held corporations."'
132. 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 172, § 12.
133. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subd. 1 (1993).
134. Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); see infra notes 150-59
and accompanying text. Although there was a petition for review filed in Skoglund, the
Minnesota Supreme Court denied the petition for review on February 27, 1996.
Accordingly, Skoglund represents the current status of Minnesota law on this issue.
135. Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 21.
136. Id.
137. MINN. STAT. § 302A.305 (1994) (describing duties of the chief executive officer
and the chief financial officer); § 302A.361 (describing duty of officers to act in best
interest of corporation); § 302A.251 (describing director's duty to act in best interest
of corporation and additional provisions for directors); § 302A.255 (describing director
conflicts of interest).
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These generally include the duties to act in good faith and in
the best interests of the corporation.1 38
The MBCA provides that a directors' liability to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages can be limited 1or
39
eliminated in the corporation's articles of incorporation.
There is no corresponding provision for officers.
A director's liability cannot be limited or eliminated,
however, for breach of the duty of loyalty to the corporation or
its shareholders, for acts or omissions not in good faith, for
intentional misconduct, for knowing violation of law, for conduct
which generates an improper personal benefit, for violation of
the securities laws, or for illegal distributions."4 Further, a
liability cannot be eliminated or limited retroactivedirector's
1
ly.

14

B. FiduciaryDuty Owed to Other Shareholders

Minnesota law, however, treats close corporations differently
for the fiduciary duty owed by shareholders. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has recognized that relations within a closely
In
held corporation are similar to that of a partnership."
1983, the MBCA was amended to specifically include the duty
which shareholders of closely held corporations owe to each
other.143 The amendment provides that "each shareholder of
a closely-held corporation has a duty to each other shareholder
to act in a fair, reasonable and honest manner. . .. 144
The concept that shareholders in close corporations owe

138. § 302A.251 (directors); § 302A.361 (officers).
139. § 302A.251, subd. 4.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g Inc., 308 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn.
1981). "We are dealing here with the special case of a close corporation, which has
been described as a parmership in corporate guise." Id.; see alsoWhetstone v. Hossfeld
Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn. 1990) (finding that closely held corporations are
"sui generis"); Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that
shareholders in a closely held corporation, much like partners in a parmership, owe
one another a fiduciary duty).
143. § 302A.751, subd. 3a.
144. § 302A.751 (Reporter's Notes-1982 to 1984, subd. 3(a)). The fiduciary duty to
other shareholders attaches immediately upon filing the articles of incorporation. See
Warthan v. Midwest Consol. Ins. Agencies, 450 N.W.2d 145, 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
Creation of the fiduciary duty does not depend on whether an entity actually becomes
an active, functioning corporation. Id.
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fiduciary duties to each other has been applied by numerous
courts.1 4 5 For instance, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has
noted that Minnesota law "imposes on each [shareholder] the
highest standard of integrity in their dealings with each other."1 6 Similarly, in Pedro v. Pedro, the court of appeals reiterated that shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one
another a fiduciary duty, including the duty to deal "openly,
honestly and fairly with other shareholders."1 4 7
The Minnesota Court of Appeals also recently held that
equitable owners1 4 of stock are owed a fiduciary duty by the
officers and directors of a closely held corporation.
Thus,
the important concept of fiduciary duty for shareholders of
closely held corporations continues to be developed through

145. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Federal District Court
have both applied the concept that shareholders of a closely held corporation owe each
other fiduciary duties. See Brennan v. Chestnut, 973 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir.
1992) (citing Harris v. Mardan Business Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988)); Stock v. Heiner, 696 F. Supp. 1253, 1261 (D. Minn. 1988). In Brennan, the
Eighth Circuit added in dictum, however, that the fiduciary duty majority shareholders
owe to minority shareholders does not apply when the minority shareholder is an
employee and acquires a small percentage of stock as part of an employment
compensation contract. Brennan, 973 F.2d at 648.
146. Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Minn. CL App. 1984). The court in Evans
found that one owner's acts of secretive planning, verbal abuse, and coercion of the
resignation of his partner constituted a violation of the fiduciary duty within a close
corporation. As a result, the shareholder who had resigned was awarded damages
against both his partner and the closely held corporation. Id. at 780-81.
147. Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Evans,
345 N.W.2d at 779). In Pedro,the court found a breach of fiduciary duty based on the
defendant-shareholder's failure to make payments admittedly due the minority
shareholder, interference with his responsibilities, hiring a private investigator to follow
him, fabrication of accusations of neglect, and threats to fire the minority shareholder
if he continued to investigate discrepancies in the company's financial records. Id. at
801-02. The court rejected the defendant's claim that there could be no breach of
fiduciary duty because there was no diminution in the value of the corporation or the
value of the minority shareholder's interest. Id. at 802. According to the court,
majority shareholders can also breach their fiduciary duty by forcing a minority shareholder's resignation. Id. But see Kelley v. Rudd, 1992 WL 3651, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 14, 1992) (rejecting the shareholder's contention that he had a reasonable
expectation of permanent employment, noting that he had signed employment
contracts that provided for his termination without cause and therefore rejected the
employee-shareholder's claim that his discharge constituted a breach of fiduciary duty).
148. Equitable owners include pledgees of stock, trust beneficiaries where the trust
owns stock, or persons who have exercised a contractual right to purchase the shares,
but who have not yet closed on the purchase. See Miller Waste Mills, Inc. v. Mackay, 520
N.W.2d 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
149. Wenzel v. Mathies, 542 N.W.2d 634, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
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judicial interpretation.
V. NEW LIMITATION ON MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS?

In a decision that appears to be at odds with the intent of
the MBCA, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently held that a
shareholder must suffer an injury that is separate and distinct
from any injury to the corporation to bring a claim under
section 302A.751. 5 ° In Skoglund v. Brady, Donald Skoglund, a
shareholder of a closely held corporation, objected to certain
leases authorized by the corporation's board, promissory notes
and bonuses issued to board members, the issuance of additional
shares of the corporation's stock and the sale of some of the
newly issued stock to board members at a price lower than the
stock's book value.151 Mr. Skoglund brought both derivative
and direct claims under Minnesota Statutes section 302A.751
against the corporation and the members of its board alleging
that the directors breached fiduciary duties, usurped corporate
12
opportunities and committed corporate waste and fraud.
The district court dismissed Mr. Skoglund's direct claims
under section 302A.751 because it determined that a shareholder
must have a separate and distinct injury to bring an action under
section 302A.751. 53
The court determined that Mr.
Skoglund's claims were derivative claims of the corporation. 54
The, court of appeals affirmed, citing cases which state the
general principle that an individual shareholder cannot assert a
cause of action that belongs to the corporation. 5 5 While this
general principle-involving the direct/derivative claim distinction- applies to causes of action involving corporations that are
not closely held, it is questionable whether it applies to claims
for equitable relief brought
under section 302A.751 involving
156
closely held corporations.

150. Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
151. Id. at 19.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 21 (citing Arent v. Distribution Sciences, Inc., 975 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th
Cir. 1992)) (applying Minnesota law); PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, 453 N.W.2d 1,
6 (Minn. 1990).
156. In Skoglund, the court of appeals primarily relied upon cases addressing the
general principle of the direct/derivative claim distinction. For instance, PJAcquisition
Corp. involved a § 302A.751 claim brought by a shareholder that did not own its shares
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Skoglund is significant because it may restrict the availability
of section 302A.751. Under Skoglund, if fraud or other actions
by the board harmed all shareholders equally, the claim would
be derivative and the section 302A.751 buy-out motion may be
unavailable to minority shareholders.
The Skoglund court's interpretation appears at odds with the
language and intent of section 302A.751. There is no language
in the statute which indicates that a shareholder must have a
distinct and separate injury to bring a claim under section
302A.751. To the contrary, section 302A.751 expressly provides
a claim for shareholders when the corporation's assets are being
misapplied or wasted. 157 Claims for corporate waste almost
always affect all shareholders equally, and historically were
brought as derivative actions.1 5 ' The enactment of section
302A.751 provided for direct claims in these cases.
Skoglund is arguably the law of Minnesota.159 Perhaps
future judicial interpretation or legislative amendment may
realign the decision with the intent of the MBCA, the statutory
language and past Minnesota decisions,.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the fifteen years since its enactment, the MBCA has
provided minority shareholders of Minnesota closely held
corporations with valuable protections. The MBCA's amendments and judicial interpretations have further extended the

at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. PJ Acquisition Corp., 453 N.W.2d at 5. The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the claim was derivative, that the rules for
derivative actions applied, and that the shareholder could not assert claims based upon
alleged wrongdoing prior to the shareholder's purchase of the shares. Id. at 6. In so
holding, the court stated, "[w] hile MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1 (1988) does expand
the options of shareholders to bring actions seeking personal damages, as distinguished
from derivative damages, the equitable remedy expanded does not replace the traditional derivative action." Id.
157. Section 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(5).
158.

SeeJOHN H. MATHESON AND PHILIP S. GARON, MINNESOTA CORPORATION LAW

& PRACTICE § 10.1, at 10-5 (1992).
159. Mr. Skoglund petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review of the
decision on both the direct/derivative claim issue and the special litigation committee
issue. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. The Minnesota Supreme Court
denied review on February 27, 1996. Skogland v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995), review denied (Minn. 1996). However, because the decision of the court of
appeals is devoid of any reasoning that explains the court's apparent departure from
the clear language of the statute, its precedential value is susceptible to attack.
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rights and remedies available to these shareholders. Section
302A.751, the buy-out provision, has been one of the most
refreshing and distinguishing features of the MBCA in addition
to one of the most powerful provisions for protecting minority
shareholders' rights by penalizing corporate malfeasance by an
abusive majority.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Skoglund, however, has
recently limited the strength of the buy-out provision. It remains
to be seen whether Skoglund is the start of a trend in decisions
which will restrict minority shareholders' rights or whether it is
an anomaly which will be rectified by future judicial interpretation or legislative amendment.
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